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PHYSICALISM AND CLASSICAL THEISM
Peter Forrest

In this paper I compare two versions of non-eliminative physicalism
(reductive physicalism and supervenience physicalism) with four of the five
theses of classical theism: divine non-contingency, divine transcendence,
divine simplicity, and the aseity thesis. I argue that:
1. Both physicalism (either version) and classical theism require intuitiontranscending identifications of some properties or possibilities.
2. Among other identifications, both reductive physicalism and classical
theism need to identify psychological with functional properties.
3. Both reductive physicalism and classical theism have a problem with
consciousness.
4. Both reductive physicalists and classical theists should distinguish fine
and coarse grained theories of properties.

Introduction

In this paper I compare non-eliminative physicalism with classical
theism, noting especially the ways in which they rely on similar theses
in analytic ontology and in philosophical psychology. Presumably there
is a moral in this: those who live in glass houses should not throw
stones.
I shall be comparing two versions of non-eliminative physicalism,
namely reductive physicalism and supervenience physicalism, with four
of the five theses of classical theism, namely divine non-contingency,
divine transcendence, divine simplicity, and the aseity thesis. I shall
have nothing much to say about a fifth thesis, divine eternity, even
though it is the temporal analog of simplicity.! Moreover I shall refrain
from strengthening the aseity thesis to what Plantinga has called the
sovereignty-aseity intuition. 2 As I understand it, the aseity thesis says
that (i) God is a se, that is not dependent for existence on anything else,
and (ii) everything else depends for its existence on God. 3
In order to give this comparison some structure I shall argue for the
following four theses:
Thesis One (intuition-transcendence):
Part (i): Both versions of non-eliminative physicalism require intuition-transcending, but not counter-intuitive, identifications of
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some properties or possibilities.'
Part (ii): Similarly, divine non-contingency, divine simplicity, and
perhaps divine transcendence require intuition-transcending, but
not counter-intuitive, identifications.
Thesis Two (the reliance on functionalism): Both reductive physicalists and classical theists have reason to identify psychological with
functional properties.
Thesis Three (the shared problem of consciousness): Both classical
theists and reductive physicalists have a problem with consciousness.
Thesis Four (the reliance on the coarse/fine distinction): One solution
to the problem of consciousness is to distinguish fine and coarse
grained theories of properties. The combination of finer and coarser
grained theories also enables us to resolve a tension between divine
simplicity and the aseity thesis.

1. Theories of possibility and of properties
To make my comparison between physicalism and classical theism I
require the appropriate context, namely theories of possibility and of
properties. Let us begin with possibility. I shall be considering the
modality of the metaphysically possible, to be distinguished from mere
logical consistency on the one hand, and from nomological and time-.
dependent possibility, on the other.
Those who think about metaphysical possibility find themselves with
various intuitions, only sometimes in agreement with those of other
metaphysicians. Here are some examples:
The Necessity of Mathematics:
All mathematical and logical truths, including those of set theory
and mereology, are necessary.
The Necessity of Identity:
True identity statements in which the referring expressions function
like proper names (eg that Hesperus is Phosphorus) are necessary.s
The Possibility of Actuality:
Whatever is true is possibly true.
An intuition which I shall seek to modify, but which might be fairly
widespread is:
The Contingency of Existence:
If something exists it is not merely logically consistent that it never
have existed but metaphysically possible.
By an intuition-bound theory of (metaphysical) possibility I mean one
which makes no assertions about possibility other than those for which
there is intuitive support. By an intuition-transcending theory I mean one
which does make further assertions. The point around which this whole
paper revolves is that intuition transcendence is not the same as being
counter-intuitive, even though we are constantly tempted to confuse the
two when it comes to metaphysical disputes. And I exhibit both physicalism and classical theism as intuition-transcending but not counterintuitive.
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An example of intuition transcendence which is directly relevant to
the present topic concerns Guleserian's intriguing modal argument from
evil. 6 Guleserian argues that there are possible worlds so evil that it is
impossible that they are created by a God who is necessarily good. Let
us call these metaphysical Gulags. This conflicts with the traditional theistic claims that (i) not merely does no contingent thing exist uncreated
but that it is metaphysically impossible for any created thing to have
existed uncreated and (ii) not merely is God in fact good, it is necessarily
the case that God is good. The response of theists has typically been to
deny the possibility of metaphysical Gulags.? But there is nothing in our
modal intuitions which excludes them. Instead theists are insisting that
it is initially an open question whether the metaphysical Gulags are possible and that they are entitled to assume that they are impossible in
order to defend theism. So, I submit, the rejection of metaphysical
Gulags is an intuition-transcending theory, and Guleserian's argument
derives its appeal from our tendency to assimilate the intuition-transcending to the counter-intuitive.
Just as we have intuitions about possibilities we have ones about
properties. Here is a firm one.
Necessity of Co-extension:
If it is metaphysically possible that something has F but not G, then
being F is not identical to being G.
More controversial are the following, starting with the converse of the
Necessity of Co-extension:
Sufficiency of Co-extension:
If being F is not identical to being G then it is either metaphysically
possible that something has F but not G or metaphysically possible
that something has G but not F.
Conjunction Principle:
If being F and being G are properties and if there is something
which is both F and G then there is a conjunctive property: being F
and G.8
Functional Property Principle:
If being G is a property of properties then having-some-propertywhich-has-G is itself a property.
Instantiation Condition:
There are no uninstantiated properties.
Resemblance Principle:
If things resemble each other to some extent because they are all Fs
then they resemble each other because of shared properties.'
More controversial still are the Disjunction and Negation Principles:
Disjunction Principle:
If F and G are both properties then there is a property of being F
and/or G.
Negation Principle:
If being F is property and there is something which is not F, then
there is a property of not being F.
Many principles such as the Instantiation Condition could be treated
as stipulations rather than intuitions. That is, we simply restrict our

Faith and Philosophy

182

attention to instantiated properties. Less drastically we might combine
an intuition-transcending ambiguity thesis with a stipulative disambiguation. For instance we might transcend our property-theoretic intuitions by postulating that there are two kinds of entity both of which
could be called properties. For one kind, perhaps, but not the other the
disjunction and negation principles hold. Given that intuition-transcending ambiguity thesis, we could then stipulate that by properties we
mean, say, the first kind of entity.
Theories of properties may differ, then, in various ways depending on
(i) the metaphysical intuitions (ii) any intuition-transcending or even
counter-intuitive postulates and (iii) any stipulations made. I shall now
give an important example of these differences, namely the distinction
between coarse and fine grained theories of properties. lo Let us say that
being F metaphysically entails being G if it is metaphysically impossible
for there to be an F which is not a G. This enables us to characterise the
two grades:
(i) The fine grade theory of properties, in which pairs of mutually
metaphysically entailing properties are allowed.
(ii) The coarse grade theory of properties, in which there is no
mutual entailment of distinct properties.
The Sufficiency of Co-extension does not hold for the fine grain theory. That might be taken as showing that fine grain theories are counterintuitive. But instead we might consider that until we stipulate one way
or the other a theory of properties is ambiguous between a fine grain
and a coarse grain theory, and that Sufficiency of Co-extension holds
only for the coarse grain theory.
One way in which this ambiguity thesis could be correct without
being ontologically extravagant would be if there is one fundamental
kind of property and the others are constructed from these in some fashion. For instance, coarse grain properties could be thought of as equivalence classes of fine grain properties under the equivalence relation of
metaphysically necessary co-extension. Conversely, fine grain properties
could be thought of as refinements of coarse grain properties. We could,
for instance, think of the fine grain property as the pair consisting of the
coarse grain property together with a way of analysing it. For example,
suppose we distinguish the fine grain properties of triangularity and trilaterality, while assuming that, of metaphysical necessity, all and only
triangles are trilaterals.l1 There is then just the one coarse grain property
but it can be analysed: (i) as being composed of three lines making a
closed figure; or (ii) as being composed of lines making a closed figure
with three angles.

2. Physicalism as metaphysics
Eliminative physicalists need not concern themselves with properties
and possibilities, but non-eliminative physicalists, I take it, believe that
there are mental properties which are, perhaps in a fallible fashion,
recognised by introspection in ones own case and spontaneously attributed to others.12 I shall not attempt a complete classification of versions
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of non-eliminative physicalism. For it sufficies for my purpose of comparison to select two somewhat different but familiar enough versions,
which I hope are representative.
A rather weak version of physicalism is the position, introduced as
far as I know by Davidson, that all truths supervene on the physical. 13
Call this supervenience physicalism. Here I shall take supervenience to
mean what Kim has called global supervenience.]' So supervenience
physicalism amounts to saying that any two possible worlds exactly
resembling each other in all physical respects exactly resemble each
other in all respects. To be sure, this thesis has been criticised as too
weak to capture the pre-theoretic idea of physicalism. 15 But it will serve
my purpose which is to make some comparisons between physicalism
and classical theism. For strengthening global supervenience will, if
anything, increase its metaphysical commitments.
I shall also consider a rather different formulation of non-eliminative
physicalism, namely reductive physicalism. As I understand it, a truth is
reduced to those of the physical sciences if it is logically entailed by a
combination of truths expressible in the physical sciences together with
appropriate bridging laws. Reductive physicalism, in its initial formulation, is the thesis that all truths are thus reducible.
The role of bridging laws in a reduction may be illustrated using the
example of thermodynamics, which we cannot reduce to statistical
mechanics until, to oversimplify things, we correlate temperature with
mean kinetic energy. This correlation is the bridging law. Such bridging laws are not themselves part of the more fundamental theory, in this
case statistical mechanics. That raises the question: 'Which correlations
are we entitled to call bridging laws?' If we had no restriction at all then
we could claim to have reduced XS to Ys whenever the Xs are correlated
with the Ys. Nor is it sufficient that the correlation be nomologically
necessary. For if it were, then those attribute dualists who believe there
are psycho-physical correlation laws would be classified as reductive
physicalists, which is absurd. Or suppose, as used to be thought, that the
laws of nature were both deterministic and time-reversible, so that the
present state of the universe plus the laws specifies both future and past
states. In that case, if nomological necessity was sufficient for a correlation to count as a bridging law we could reduce the past and future to
the present, or, even more absurdly, reduce past, present and near
future all to the state of the universe at some date in the far future. I
draw the conclusion that bridging laws should hold of a necessity
stronger than the nomological, and metaphysical necessity is the obvious candidate.
If, however, metaphysical necessity were the only constraint on the
bridging laws, then reductive physicalism would not be much stronger
than supervenience physicalism. 10 My immediate purpose is to find
some specimen formulations of physicalism in order to make the comparisons with classical theism. For the sake of variety in my specimens, I
shall, therefore, seek a stronger version of reductive physicalism, based
on an alternative account of reduction. In the case of thermodynamics
the bridging laws are type/type (ie property/property) identities. Thus
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the property of being at, say, lOOoe is identified with the property of
having such and such mean kinetic energy. That suggests the type/type
identity theory of such 'old time' physicalists as Smart. I shall interpret
reductive physicalism in this way, although, in response to the following
objection, this type/ type identification will be taken as just the first stage
of a two stage reduction.
The objection to type/type identification is quite general but may
conveniently be illustrated using the example of pain. We should resist
the attempt to identify the property of being in pain with the property of
having certain brain processes, on the grounds that the same type of
brain processes might, in a different circumstances, have caused behaviour which systematically tended to increase the relevant stimuli, which,
moreover, were not harmful but beneficial to the organism. If that were
so for a whole species it would be strange, to say the least, to label it as
'mad pain' and insist that both in our case and the case of that species
the brain process in question was pain. '7 In reply to this the physicalist
might say that pain is a property of the whole nervous system, even the
whole body, not just of the brain. For this reply to succeed it is crucial
that the way the muscles are stimulated by spiking frequencies in
nerves should be included in the property identified with being in pain.
Otherwise a species for which decreased spiking frequency was responsible for muscle activity would exhibit quite different behaviour while
still having the property purportedly identified with pain.
Incorporating all this detail about the motor nerves and muscles into
the characterisation of the property of being in pain meets my original
objection but it leaves the type-type identity theorist open to the opposite objection, namely that now there could be cases of pain without all
these details being as they are with us. In particular there could be a
species for which the muscles did require a decrease in spiking frequency of the motor neurones to be stimulated but which had a nervous system much like ours except where our motor nerves have increased spiking frequencies theirs have less. It would be counter-intuitive to suggest
that such animals could not feel pain.
These, and other, problems should push the reductive physicalist
towards a reliance on functionalism, namely the characterisation of mental states by means of their functional characteristics. In the context of an
investigation into the nature of mental properties this amounts to the
identification of mental with functional properties. For instance, being in
pain would be identified with the property: instantiating some property
the instantiation of which typically causes pain behaviour and is typically causally related to various other mental properties in the appropriate
ways. As a matter of contingent fact, physicalists then say, the only
instantiated properties whose instantiation typically causes pain behaviour etc are physical properties.
I consider this to be the best way of overcoming the difficulties with
reductive physicalism and I draw the conclusion that it requires functionalism, namely the thesis that all mental properties are functional
ones.
A corollary, however, of the reliance on functionalism is that there
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has been a two step not a one step reduction of the psychological to the
physical. For physicalists are first reducing the psychological to the functional, by identifying properties, and then reducing the functional to the
physical. The latter reduction is based on the existential form of a functional property, namely: having some property such that X. As a matter
of contingent fact, physicalists tell us, all the instantiated properties such
that X are physical ones.
I have characterised two versions of non-eliminative physicalism. I
shall now argue for Part (i) of Thesis One by considering them in turn.
Supervenience physicalism is, I say, based on the concept of metaphysical necessity. For there is nothing logically inconsistent or inconceivable
about dualism. So there are conceivable, and logically possible 'worlds'
in which dualism is correct. Hence if metaphysical necessity were assimilated to logical or conceptual necessity the mental would not supervene
on the physical. On the other hand, if we assimilated metaphysical to
nomological necessity then any dualists who allowed that there were
strict psycho-physical laws correlating mental states with physical
processes would satisfy the definition of supervenience physicalism,
which I find absurd. Supervenience physicalists are thus committed to
the modality of metaphysical necessity.
Moreover, in order to hold supervenience physicalism, it is not
enough to accept the modality of metaphysical necessity. An intuitiontranscending theory is required, whereby the range of possibilities is
restricted. Otherwise the mental need not supervene on the physical
because it could supervene instead on what Lewis jokingly refers to as
ghost stuff. Or, more seriously, the mental could supervene on alien possibilities, that is possibilities unlike anything actual. The reason for this
is that functional properties may be realised in anything which plays the
appropriate role and so may be realised in alien possibilities, with suitably complex structureY Supervenience physicalism requires, therefore,
an intuition-transcending restriction of the range of possible worlds so
as to exclude alien possibilities. This establishes Part (i) of Thesis One
for the case of supervenience physicalism.
I now turn to reductive physicalism. I shall argue that any reductive
physicalists who insist upon an intuition-bound theory of properties are
committed to an intuition-transcending theory of possibilities. So in
some way or other reductive physicalists are committed to intuitiontranscendence.
Let us consider, then, those reductive physicalists who insist on an
intuition-bound theory of possibilities. I have interpreted reductive
physicalism as requiring the identification of mental with functional
properties. Now there is no logical equivalence between 'feels like that'
said of pain and the corresponding functional characterisation. In particular there is no logical incoherence in the idea of trees suffering pain
when being cut down but having no capacity for any kind of aversive
behaviour-these are not the ones which grab the chain saw-and so not
satisfying the functional characterisation of pain. How, then, can mental
properties be identified with functional ones in the absence of logical
equivalence? The only relevant intuition here is the Sufficiency of Co-
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extension, which states that no distinct properties can be co-extensive of
metaphysical necessity. Thus the reductive physicalists whom we are
considering will insist upon the metaphysical (but not the logical)
necessity of the co-extension of mental and functional properties. Hence
the logically possible 'worlds' in which trees feel pain when their limbs
are sawn off are metaphysically impossible. Such a restriction of the
metaphysically possible is, I submit, intuition-transcending.
In reply to this, reductive physicalists might insist that there can be
no distinct properties which are co-extensive of nomological necessity.
That would be to reject the possibility of a form of attribute dualism in
which there is a psycho-physical law perfectly correlating distinct mental and physical properties. While that rejection might have something
to recommend it, it does not save reductive physicalists from intuitiontranscendence. For there is nothing counter-intuitive about distinct
properties perfectly correlated of nomological necessity. Indeed quantum physics seems to have provided us with two, related, examples of
just such perfect correlations, namely: (i) that between having spin
(intrinsic angular momentum) of magnitude an even times that of an
electron and being a boson; and (ii) that between having spin of magnitude an odd times that of an electron and being a fermion.''!
I conclude that reductive physicalism requires an intuition-transcending theory either of properties or of possibilities. This completes my case
for Part (i) of Thesis One.

3. Diville non-contingency
Part (ii) of Thesis One states that, just like supervenience and reductive physicalists, classical theists should resort to intuition-transcending
theories of possibilities and/or properties. They need to do so in order
to defend divine non-contingency, divine transcendence and divine simplicity. I start with divine non-contingency. Here there is a straightforward comparison with supervenience physicalism. Initially we might
think there are possible worlds with and without God, just as initially
we might think there are possible worlds containing humanoids with
and without non-physical attributes. In both cases we restrict the range
of possible worlds in ways which are not counter-intuitive so much as
intuition-transcending.
Indeed the comparison may be taken further. For theists could, if they
wished, be supervenience physicalists without considering God to be a
physical substance. To establish this compatibility between theism and
supervenience physicalism I require some further speculations, which,
I invite readers to grant, are jointly coherent. The first is that God cannot create non-physical things, or things with non-physical properties.
This is not because of any lack of divine power but because without
physicality nothing could be distinct from God. 20 The second speculation
is the intuition-transcending thesis that physical things cannot, as
attribute dualists suggest, have non-physical properties. The third is
that having created a physical universe of a given kind, God's relations
with that universe flow from the divine compassion without any further
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exercise of power. Putting these three speculations together we might
speculate that all possible worlds are ones in which God creates, if at all,
one or more physical universes, and that there is no difference between
such worlds without a physical difference. In particular it is not within
God's power to have created a universe like this one without acting
towards it as God has. 21 Such a highly speculative line of thought would
reconcile supervenience physicalism with belief in a non-physical noncontingent God.
Divine non-contingency, then, requires just the sort of intuition transcendence that supervenience physicalism requires. In addition the two
positions are compatible. Or so I say, but this case for Part (ii) of Thesis
One would collapse if there is a firm intuition that everything which
exists, even God, does so contingently. For in that case divine non-contingency would be counter-intuitive rather than merely intuition-transcending. 22
In this context we need to distinguish between merely defeating an
intuition and dissolving it. Intuitions are, I assume, tendencies to
believe. (Although not all tendencies to believe are intuitions). I shall say
that an intuition is merely defeated by some argument if the argument
provides a reason for resisting that tendency without removing it. I shall
say that an argument dissolves the intuition if it removes even the tendency to believe. The axioms of naive set theory provide an example:
many of us find Russell's Paradox disconcerting because the intuitions
leading to the paradox have not been dissolved, merely defeated.
Likewise a good argument for a non-contingent God might merely
exhibit a clash between the intuition that existence is contingent and
those intuitions on which the argument is based. So even if we considered the Contingency of Existence defeated, divine non-contingency
would still be counter-intuitive. By contrast consider an intuitive tendency to believe that if every particle will pass out of existence then
eventually there will be no particles. This would be dissolved by an
explanation of the fallacy involved.
In order to defend divine non-contingency as intuition-transcending
rather than counter-intuitive, I must dissolve the Contingency of
Existence, not merely defeat it. The method I shall use, rational deconstruction, is generally applicable to those intuitions which are the result
of implicit, unconscious, arguments. (Perhaps all philosopher's intuitions are of that sort. I do not know. But at least many of them are.) The
method of dissolving such intuitions is to uncover the implicit arguments for the supposedly intuitive belief, with the aim of showing that it
stands or falls with the success of those implicit arguments. Hence if it
falls, the intuition is not merely defeated but dissolved.
Let me begin with an implicit argument which Aquinas could have
explicitly endorsed for complex entities. One reason, I say, why we tend
to think of existence as contingent is because anything which can cease
to exist is contingent and anything with structure could cease to exist
because its components could come to be related differently. We might
well criticise this argument even for complex things. 23 My point, though,
is that anyone who grants that it was reliance on some such argument
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which was supporting the apparently intuitive principle that existence is
contingent should grant that the intuition would not apply to God if
God is without the sort of structure which results in the metaphysical
possibility of disintegration.
Perhaps the commonest implicit argument, however, derives from
Kant's rejection of Descartes' version of the ontological argument. It is
indeed plausible that no true existential statement is analytically noncontingent. (By which I mean non-contingent due to the way language
functions. 24 ) The point has been made repeatedly, however, that theists-and atheists-who take God to be non-contingent need not be
interpreted as taking the existence of God to be analytically non-con tingent. 2'
Opponents of divine non-contingency could reply that their rejection of the analytic non-contingency of God's existence is not the whole
of their case but rather serves to focus our attention on what the synthetic non-contingency could be due to. This question is especially
pressing in the present context because there is a Kantian account of
such synthetic non-contingency, namely that it is the result of our constructing empirical reality in a systematic fashion out of things-in-themselves. Some such account could perhaps be adopted by physicalists
who might take the mental as constructed out of the physical, whether
or not the physical is identified, in non-Kantian fashion, with the thingsin-themselves. Theists should not, however, take God to be a construct
and so should not adopt the Kantian account of necessity for the case of
God. For our concept of God is of something which cannot exist merely
as a construct. 26
This line of argument against divine non-contingency can, then, be
construed as a trilemma: either non-contingency is analytic or due to
our construction or it is mysterious. The existence of God is not noncontingent in either of the first two ways so it is mysterious, which is a
reason for rejecting it.
My response is that there are many non-Kantian ways of explaining
non-contingency. Interestingly, here there is a parallel not with physicalism itself but with a thesis many physicalists hold, namely that the
laws of nature although metaphysically contingent have their own kind
of non-contingency which is neither analytic nor capable of Kantian
explanation. 27 Non-contingency could, for instance, be explained in
terms of time-dependent truth. 28 Or it could be explained by means of
higher order universals. 29 The details are beyond the scope of this
paper, but my response, in outline, is that Kant discovered just one of
many explanations of thOSE non-contingencies which are not analytic.
The case for the parallel between divine non-contingency and supervenience physicalism depends, then, on the rejection of the principle that
all existence is contingent. I submit that this principle is one of those
intuitions which are the result of implicit arguments, and these arguments, once made explicit, are seen to fail, thus dissolving the intuition.
I hold, then, that divine non-contingency is not counter-intuitive, but,
merely, as I have been advocating, intuition-transcending.
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4. Divine transcendence
Whereas supervenience physicalism provided the comparison with
divine non-contingency, it turns out that reductive physicalism provides
the comparison with divine transcendence and divine simplicity.
By divine transcendence I do not mean the fairly obvious thesis that
we do not fully comprehend God or the outlandish thesis that we can
say nothing true of God. Rather I mean that God is not like any other
thing, or, which J stipulate is to mean the same, God resembles other
things in no respect. Perhaps some classical theists would want to go
further and deny that God shares any properties at all with other entities. 30 They could be accommodated by an intuition-transcending restriction of properties to ones which constitute respects of resemblance. (So
the converse of the Resemblance Principle would hold.)
Before proceeding I shall make two remarks on which properties
constitute respects of resemblance. The first is that intuitively negative
properties do not constitute respects of resemblance. For instance the
fact that both God and the Ganges have the property of never being
frozen does not constitute a respect of resemblance. The second is that a
relational property might constitute a respect of resemblance. For the
property might be analysed as something having a relation to some
part or attribute of itself. That two objects, for instance, have a part
made of gold would constitute a respect in which they resemble each
other. This leaves us with the following candidates for properties sharing which constitutes a respect of resemblance: those which are intuitively positive and are either non-relational or analysed only in terms
of relations with parts or attributes of the thing itself. I shall call such
properties intrinsic and the remainder extrinsic. I shall assume, then,
that all and only intrinsic properties constitute respects of resemblance.
Hence divine transcendence is the thesis that God shares with other
beings no intrinsic properties. 1J
Notice that on the definition I have given such relational properties as
having-a-daughter are extrinsic. Now there may be those who would
restrict the extrinsic properties to ones such as being-Alice's-parent,
where some particular is mentioned. If so they should take my definition
as stipulative, and intended to give the intuitively correct result about
resemblance. For I do not regard having a daughter as a respect of
resemblance. Or, if even this is queried, I would submit that the concept
of divine transcendence admits an explication in which resemblance is
restricted to those respects which I have stipulated to be extrinsic.
One objection to the transcendence of God'2 is that God and created
things must share the property of having some property. Having some
property is, however, a necessary condition for resemblance but not,
strictly speaking, a respect of resemblance. So if we decide it was intrinsic we should take it as a counter-example to my claim that all intrinsic
properties are respects of resemblance, rather than as a counter-example
to divine transcendence. Instead I say that it is not an intrinsic property,
for it is analysed as standing in a certain 'relation' namely instantiation
to some property or other. Either instantiation is not a genuine relation
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in which case having a property should not itself be a property, or instantiation is a genuine relation in which case having a property is extrinsic.
Another puzzling case is temporality. Clearly we are temporal
beings, so if being temporal is an intrinsic property then divine transcendence implies divine eternity. I shall argue, however, that there are two
distinct ways of being temporal only one of which is the having of an
intrinsic property of being temporal. A transcendent God may therefore
be temporal in the other, extrinsic, sense. The intrinsic way of being temporal is being composed of temporal parts or stages some of which are
later than others. For that, although a relational property, is analysed
only in terms of relations with parts or attributes of the thing itself. A
transcendent God cannot, I grant, have temporal parts or stages. But
there is an extrinsic way in which God can be temporal, namely standing in temporal relations to created things. That sort of temporality is
quite compatible with transcendence. 33
I shall now speculate as to how a God without temporal stages might
nonetheless stand in temporal relations to creation. I begin by considering the proposal, associated with Godel's solution to the equations of
general relativity, that time is circular, with the distant future being not
merely qualitatively but numerically the same as the distant past.
Against this it could be objected that no event is earlier than itself but
being earlier than is transitive. From these two premisses we may infer
that there is no cycle of events, El, ..., En such that El is earlier than E2,
E2 is earlier than E3 etc, but En is in its turn earlier than El. But such a
cycle would occur if time was circular. The obvious reply to this is that if
time were circular then the temporal ordering would not be transitive
but only locally transitive. An analog is the relation of being-West-of. If
we ignore regions near the Poles then being-West-of is locally transitive,
but it is not transitive without qualification. Now I do not believe time
is circular in the way that Godel's solution suggests. But that example
and the analogy with being-West-of enables me to speculate that God,
without any division into temporal stages, stands in two temporal relations to creation. As the Alpha' God is earlier than all else; as the
'Omega', God is later than everything else. And that can hold even if
the everything else consists of events without end. 34
I now turn to a more serious objection to divine transcendence. Those
who endorse it nonetheless attribute to God various quite determinate
psychological characteristics which can also be attributed to human
beings. Initially these would seem to correspond to intrinsic properties.
Thus God is almost always said to be wise and loving, and sometimes
said to have aesthetic sensibilities and a sense of humour. Does it not follow, then, that God and human beings share various psychological
properties? Now there are a number of accounts on which it is denied
that these things are predicated univocally of God and human beings,
but discussing these accounts is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, I
am interested in defending the transcendence of God without undermining the univocity of what is said of God and human beings.
One way out of this difficulty is to follow Alston35 and identify these
determinate psychological properties with functional ones, where the
I
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functional roles are performed in one way in human beings and in
another in God. Thus by identifying determinate psychological properties with functional ones we can explain how various predicates are
applied univocally to God and to human beings even though the only
shared properties are extrinsic ones. For example, loving-kindness
might be identified with the functional property of having some property (the grounding property) the having of which spontaneously results
in what is good for others regardless of their deserts. (Or if that is too
crude, T ask readers to fill in the details.) In that case loving kindness is
indeed shared by God and most human beings, provided we read 'others' as 'some others' not 'all others'. It is, however, extrinsic, while the
grounding property in virtue of which God has loving kindness, which
may well be intrinsic, is not shared with any human beings.
In further support of this Alstonian account Tnote that the grounding
property in virtue of which some human beings are full of loving kindness is probably either wholly or in part a complex structural property of
their brains. Clearly God does not share such a property with any of us.
There are, however, some divine attributes, notably self-knowledge
and self-love, which cannot shown to be extrinsic in quite this way. For,
in both the human and divine case, self-knowledge and self-love are
analysed in terms of relations with (parts or attributes of) the one who
has the property in question. What shall we say of these? Here we need
to characterise the relations of knowing or loving functionally, namely
as being related by a relation (the grounding relation) the holding of
which typically has certain specified results. Having characterised the
relations of loving or knowing functionally we do not then need a direct
functional characterisation of the special reflexive cases of self-love and
self-knowledge. And we may now say that the grounding relations in
virtue of which God knows or loves are different from those for human
beings.
The crucial point that many psychological properties are extrinsic can
be re-stated using the broad/narrow psychology distinction. A broad
psychological property is one which is an extrinsic property of the person's mind, and a narrow psychological property is one which is intrinsic to the mind. There has been persuasive argument that many psychological properties are indeed broad. Thus Putnam argues for the broad
status of even such prima facie narrow states as belief.36 Without denying that there are some interesting narrow psychological properties,
such as the desire that feeling thirsty cease, this emphasis on the broad
character of many determinate psychological properties supports the
thesis that all the psychological properties any creature shares with God
are extrinsic ones. Thus we are able to defend divine transcendence, and
in a way which provides evidence for Thesis Three.
The most serious objection to divine transcendence, however, is provided not by any determinate psychological property but by consciousness itself, which is, it would seem, shared by God, we ourselves and,
presumably, at least some animals; but is not shared by rocks, plants
and philosophers' zombies. Here supervenience physicalism is of little
comfort to classical theists, for the property of consciousness might well
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be a supervenient one. Reductive physicalists, however, share the problem of consciousness with classical theists. For just as it threatens to be
an intrinsic property shared by God and us, violating divine transcendence, it also threatens to be a non-physical property. Consciousness
presents much the same problem, then, for reductive physicalists and
classical theists, a problem to which I shall return.
Divine transcendence, then, may be defended by resort to the combination of functionalism with some response to the problem of consciousness. This provides support for Theses Two and Three.

5. Divine simplicity
I now turn to the perplexing thesis, quite central to classical theism,
that God is simple. Initially we might characterise this as the thesis that
in God there is a distinction neither of parts nor of properties. A simple
entity might, however, stand in one or more relations to other entities.
We should allow, therefore, a multiplicity of properties provided these
are analysed in terms of relations with other entities. And clearly, if
there are negative properties then God has many of them. Divine simplicity should be reformulated, therefore, as the thesis that in God there
is neither a multiplicity of parts not a multiplicity of intrinsic properties.
The mention of parts might well be redundant, for we may be guided by
the intuition that every mereologically complex thing would have the
intrinsic property of having at least two parts. In any case, because classical theists deny that God is spatially extended, they can easily take any
prima facie parts of God (eg the three persons of the orthodox doctrine
of the Trinity) as prima facie cases of a multiplicity of properties. 37 I shall
therefore concentrate on divine simplicity as excluding a multiplicity of
intrinsic properties.
Many classical theists such as Aquinas would go further and deny
that in God there are even such categorial distinctions as that between
substance and property.38 This denial of categorial structure could be
taken to imply that God is not a thing and so not the sort of thing to
have properties. I myself have considerable sympathy with this position,
which might seem, however, to trivialise the discussion of whether God
has a multiplicity of properties. To avoid trivialisations, I allow an
instrumentalist attitude towards ontology: it is as if God is a substance
and has at least one property, divinity. The question can then be raised
within the scope of this 'as if' whether there is any multiplicity of intrinsic properties.
God has intuitively distinct properties such as self-love and selfknowledge. I have, however, already argued that these are to be treated
as the reflexive case of relations which are functionally characterised
and so extrinsic. To be sure the grounding relations for (divine) love and
knowledge are intrinsic. But it is not so much counter-intuitive as intuition-transcending to identify these two relations. (So we have another
illustration of Thesis One.)
The chief problem with divine simplicity does not, then, arise from
the identification of 'intuitively distinct' intri: [sic properties, which are
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typically the unknown groundings of familiar enough functional properties." The chief problem as I see it is this: How could a God without
any multiplicity of intrinsic properties exhibit psychological complexity?
As in the case of divine transcendence, functionalism solves this problem by motivating the claim that the many distinct mental properties we
share with God are extrinsic ones. Provided the one underlying state has
many effects it can play many functional roles. Hence in the divine case
there need only be the one grounding property.
An objection to this way of reconciling ontological simplicity with
psychological complexity is that the extrinsic (broad) psychological
properties, partly characterised by relations with items in our environment, are correlated with intrinsic (narrow) ones, which are the objects
of introspection. For example even if, as Putnam has argued. the desire
for a glass of water is extrinsic, the desire that thirst cease would seem to
be intrinsic. Likewise, the multiplicity of extrinsic psychological properties shared by God and human beings must, the objection goes, reflect a
multiplicity of narrow psychological properties in God, even if these are
quite unlike the narrow psychological properties we humans have.
To the extent that we are merely extrapolating from the human case
this objection is somewhat irrelevant, for it is already acknowledged that
God is unlike a human being. There are, however, a couple of arguments
behind the intuition that broad psychological properties depend on narrow ones. One of them is that we would not call a functional property a
psychological or mental one unless it had an introspectible component.'"
Otherwise every refrigerator could literally feel comfortably cool or
uncomfortably hot. Another argument is that for any broad psychological property there is the possibility of an introspectively indistinguishable
narrow one occurring in an hallucinatory, or otherwise non-veridical,
fashion. If one or both of these arguments is persuasive then we must
grant that a being with no multiplicity of intrinsic properties must lack
psychological complexity. And I think it is precisely here that the simplicity of God has seemed so absurd to many. A simple God would seem
to be one whose mental state was bare consciousness like Brahman is
often taken to be. And how could we call such a God personal?
I shall reply to these two arguments in turn. First, there is no need to
posit distinct narrow states as the introspectible component of distinct
broad states. So the one divine narrow mental state could be the introspectible component of all the many divine broad mental states. And the
reason why there is no need to posit distinct narrow states is that the
broad ones are characterised functionally and one item can perform
many functions. To take a low technology example, a piece of steel of a
certain characteristic shape, which I call a wrecking bar, is apt for:
removing nails; prising beams apart; moving heavy stones; keeping
over-enthusiastic guard dogs at bay; etc.
Concerning the positing of narrow properties introspectively indistinguishable from the broad ones: these are posited precisely because of
the possibility of such non-veridical mental states as beliefs with false
existential presuppositions, hallucinatory sensations and so on. There is
no need to posit them in the case of God.
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My reply leads, however, to a further problem. For if the richness of
the divine mental life derives from a multiplicity of extrinsic properties,
then, it could be objected, except for creation the divine mental life would
be impoverished. For what extrinsic properties could God have except
for creation? One response to this is to allow a Platonic realm of abstract
entities, possibilia etc which exist independently of God. Relations with
these might well provide the extrinsic properties required for a rich
divine psychological life. But the existence of such a Platonic realm even
prior to creation might seem to conflict with the combination of divine
simplicity and the aseity thesis itself.41 For if the abstract entities depend
on God without being created, should not they be parts or attributes of
God? I shall treat this as a problem with aseity rather than simplicity.
For the moment I simply record that, if we ignore aseity, divine simplicity can be defended using a combination of the intuition-transcending
identification of various intrinsic properties, with a functionalist account
of those psychological properties shared with us. This supports Thesis
Two.

6. Consciousness re-examined, and the aseity thesis
The final topic on the list is the aseity thesis, but before I consider the
problem it raises I shall re-open the question of consciousness. Consider
the imitation person whose brain processes play all the functional roles
of ours, including those for pain, but feels nothingY Such an imitation
person is functionally indistinguishable from one of us but is nonetheless a fake, lacking consciousness. 'Not metaphysically possible!' physicalists can reply, or 'There is no property of being conscious'.
Nonetheless there is enormous intuitive appeal in the thought experiment. It draws our attention to an astounding fact about ourselves
which distinguishes us from the way we normally imagine rocks and
plants to be. And unless we resort to the rather drastic expedient of
panpsychism, surely being conscious is something which adds to the
resemblance of things, like us, which are conscious.<3 So if we grant the
Resemblance Principle as a property-theoretic intuition then the denial
that consciousness is a property would not merely be intuition-transcending, but, it would seem, counter-intuitive.'" Consciousness would
then be a property. Furthermore, if it is a property then it is an intrinsic
one, for surely that we are conscious is a respect in which we resemble
each other but do not resemble the imitation person.
Admitting a property of consciousness is quite compatible with
supervenience physicalism-it is a supervenient property provided
there is no metaphysical possibility of an imitation person. But it is a
serious difficulty for reductive physicalists, for, we have supposed, the
imitation person is functionally indistinguishable from us. Hence the
attempted functionalist characterisation of consciousness will result in
the characterisation of a property which I shall call proto-consciousness
which is, at best, coextensive with consciousness of metaphysical necessity, but not identical to it. We have, then, a further point of comparison
between, in this case, reductive physicalism and divine simplicity,
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namely Thesis Three which tells us that they have a shared problem
with consciousness.
My solution to this problem is to adopt Thesis Four: reductive physicalists should allow both fine and coarse grain properties. We can insist
that our property-theoretic intuitions are a mixture of ones appropriate
for the two different theories. We are then able to say that for the purposes of formulating reductive physicalism we need a coarse grain theory, in which consciousness and proto-consciousness are identified, but
that reflections on imitation persons alert us to various fine grain properties.
Whether or not physicalists resort to having both finer and coarser
grain theories of properties I shall now argue that there are good reasons
why classical theists should. This is because of the problem with the aseity thesis, which states that everything other than God depends on God.
The problem with aseity does not concern the dependence of contingent
things. For these, theists traditionally believe, were created by God. No
the problem comes with the necessary beings, namely the Platonic realm
of properties and possibilities, and other abstract entities. For unless
God is aware of the possibilities prior to creation then it is totally mysterious as to how God could create wisely and well. The obvious solution
to this problem is to assert that for God a nominalist or conceptualist
theory of the Platonic realm would be correct and that there is nothing
more to unactualised possibilities and uninstantiated properties than the
divine knowledge of what is possible.
That nominalist solution implies that the divine knowledge of possibilities is an intrinsic property, which leads to a further problem. For
now we seem to have two distinct intrinsic divine properties, the knowledge of possibilities and self-knowledge. One response by classical theists
is to insist that once again we are mistaking the intuition-transcending
for the counter-intuitive. We may transcend our intuitions by treating the
divine knowledge of possibilities as the very same property as the divine
self knowledge, perhaps because, in some way, the possibilities reflect
the nature of God. But this leads to yet another problem. For then there
is no distinction between God's knowing this possibility and God's
knowing that possibility, and hence no explanation of why God chooses
this rather than that. At very least it would seem that God must know the
possible worlds as distinct in order to create some but not others.
I shall not, therefore, rely on the nominalist solution. Instead I propose reliance upon a fine grained theory of properties when stating the
aseity thesis but a coarse grain theory when considering divine simplicity and transcendence. Thus we can explain how God chooses to create
this rather than that by noting that there are distinct fine grain properties
corresponding to these items of knowledge, even though they correspond to the very same coarse grain property. And, as I have already
indicated, an analogous move could be made by physicalists in order to
defend physicalism from the problem of consciousness. This supports
Thesis Four.
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7. Deflation
Physicalists are faced with the problem of consciousness, classical theists
with the problem of the abstract entities. One response which both can
make is to distinguish a fine from a coarse grain theory. There are obviously
deflationary but also apparently non deflationary ways of interpreting this.
The apparently non-deflationary interpretation is to insist that the most fundamental properties are indeed the coarse ones, and so some strong theses
(notably the physicalists' denial of non-physical properties and the classical theists' denial of any distinction between the divine intrinsic properties)
are true if we take the concept of a property in its more fundamental sense.
It is then granted that a fine grain theory of properties can be derived from
the coarse grain theory by considering, say, different analyses. For example,
the grounding for self-knowledge would be the same coarse grain property
as the grounding for knowledge of possibilities, but analysed in different
ways just as in my earlier example of triangularity and trilaterality.
The obviously deflationary account is the other way round. On it the
fundamental properties are the fine grain ones and we construct coarse
grade properties from them by identifying properties which are metaphysically mutually entailing. Given that way of looking at it, divine simplicity, for instance, would amount to no more than saying that the
divine properties are co-extensive of metaphysical necessity. And reductive physicalism would, for the special case of consciousness, amount to
no more than supervenience physicalism: of metaphysical necessity there
are no imitation persons.
There is, however, a problem with the non-deflationary account when
it comes to divine simplicity. I find it hard to envisage how we can refine
coarse properties which were themselves simple, that is ones which lack
both any multiplicity of intrinsic properties (which would then be properties of properties) and any structure or composition out of other properties. Hence it would seem that we save the astounding doctrine of the
simplicity of God only by positing a single intrinsic divine property, call
it divinity, which it itself complex. We have merely shifted the complexity up from the particular to its unique intrinsic property. And that is
itself a deflationary move.

Conclusion
I conclude that non-eliminative physicalism, especially reductive
physicalism is up to its neck in metaphysics and in much the same way
as classical theism. Both need to resort to intuition-transcending theories
of metaphysical possibility and/or properties, and both, I say, need to
resort to a distinction between finer and coarser grain properties. In addition to these metaphysical similarities, reductive physicalism and classical theism are similar in their philosophical psychologies. Both require
care when it comes to the property of consciousness and, more generally,
both need to be supported by functionalism.
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NOTES
*
Versions of this paper were read to seminars at the University of
New England in August 1994, and the Australian National University in
October 1994. 1 would like to thank all who contributed to the discussion on
those occasion. I would also like to thank both Barry Miller and the anonymous referee for their helpful comments.
1. If God is simple and if God has at least one property essentially, then
God does not change. I fail to see, however, how this implies that God is
eternal in the sense of being a non-temporal being. To be sure, contemporary Tarmenideans' hold that any temporal being has temporal parts in
which case simplicity directly implies eternity, but that argument depend
more on the philosophy of time than on philosophical theology.
2. See Alvin Plantinga, Does God have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1980), pp. 54-55. The part of sovereignty-aseity I am not
endorsing is that everything is within God's control. God might have relinquished control on certain matters; or abstract entities, while dependent on
God, might not be within God's control.
3. This is stronger than saying that God and God only is a se. For that
would hold if God was a se, but some other things belong to an infinite
regress of dependence relations without depending on God.
4. By an identification of X and Y I mean the theoretical claim that X is
the very same as Y.
5. Or, equivalently, the intuition is that proper names are rigid designators.
6. Theodore Guleserian, 'God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem
of Evil', NOils 17 (1983) pp. 221-238.
7. See, for instance, Laura L. Garcia, 'A response to the Modal Problem
of Evil', Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984), pp. 378-388, especially the remarks on
intuitions on p. 384.
8. See D. M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific
Realism, Volume n (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Ch 15,
for a clear commitment to the Conjunction Principle.
9. 1£ it is denied that properties are universals then we should say that a
property is 'shared' by two particulars just in case they have exactly resembling properties.
10. Bealer calls the coarse grade qualities, the fine grade concepts. See
George Bealer, Quality and Concept (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982), Ch 8.
11. This example stands in for a more complicated one that r find more
persuasive. Characterise trilaterality as: being made up of the line segments
AB, BC and CA for three distinct points A, Band C . Now characterise being
a Jordan curve as: being the continuous one to one image of a circle.
Assuming the properties of space are essential, then of necessity trilaterality
is co-extensive with the conjunction of trilaterality and being a Jordan curve.
The analog for quadrilaterality does not hold. (Consider the figure made up
of AB, BD, DC, and CA, where ABCD is a square. That figure is not a Jordan
curve, for Jordan curves do not intersect themselves.) That there is no such
coextension in the case of quadrilaterality, supports the claim that even in
the case of trilaterality we have two distinct properties.
12. Spontaneous beliefs in the mental states of others are, presumably,
grounded in, without being consciously justified by, the perception of what
is physical, especially behaviour.
13. Donald Davidson 'Mental Events' in Essays on Actions and Events
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
14. Jaegwon Kim, 'Concepts of Supervenience', Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 45 (1984) pp. 153-76.
15. In response to such criticism Horgan has recently proposed regional
supervenience, which is that no regions of any possible world can be qualitatively identical in all physical respects without being qualitatively identical
in all respects. See Terence Horgan, 'From Supervenience to
Superdupervenience', Mind, 102 (1993), pp. 555-586. There is, however, a
position to which the referee has drawn my attention, that of a substance
dualist who considers the mental to supervene on the physical. That is, there
could be no two possible worlds with the very same physical substances
and the very same allocation of physical properties to those substances, but
with different mental substances or a different allocation of mental properties to mental substances. As far as I can see that position would satisfy
Horgan's regional supervenience, but some might deny that it counts as
physicalism of any sort. For my purposes I shall stipulate that it does.
16. The most notable case of a non-reductive supervenience physicalism
is Davidson's anomalous monism. It fails to be reductive because there are
no psycho-physical correlations.
17. See David Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', in Philosophical
Papers, Vol I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Abnormal
'Martians' might be in mad pain, but not all Martians could be.
18. For that reason Lewis, who seems reluctant to restrict the range of
possibilities, has characterised a position called minimal materialism, which
is weaker than supervenience physicalism. According to it, the mental
supervenes on the physical only in a weaker sense of 'supervenes' based on
a restriction of possibility to those possible worlds not containing alien natural properties. See David Lewis, 'New work for a Theory of Universals',
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983), pp. 343-77. The formulation of
minimal materialism is on p.364.
19. 50sons and fermions are characterised by their statistical behaviour.
In particular fermions unlike bosons are, in a suitably qualified sense,
unable to occupy exactly the same state.
20. This is an extension of Aquinas' thesis that there can be no multiplicity of things of a given kind unless they differ in their matter.
21. I have refrained from speculating that God does have that power but
is necessarily good and so necessarily does not exercise it. If the only prohibition on imitation persons is the necessity of divine goodness then we
have not, I submit, captured the full force of the physicalist's rejection of
imitation persons. Theists should, therefore, modify the definition of supervenience physicalism by considering not the possible worlds but the larger
class of those worlds x such that God has the power to do something which
if it were done would establish the possibility of x.
22. As Daniel Nolan pointed out to me, a similar case cannot be made for
the counter-intuitive character of the claim that God necessarily does not
exist.
23. Perhaps along the lines of Plantinga's criticisms of the argument
from divine aseity to divine simplicity. (Does God have a Nature? pp. 28-38.)
24. Note that a Kripkean necessity of identity while not analytic could be
analysed as the conjunction of an existential claim and an analytic non-contingency claim. If that is correct, then it is true in virtue of the way language functions that if Hesperus is Phosphorus then necessarily Hesperus
is Phosphorus.
25. See for instance Thomas V. Morris, 'Necessary Beings', Mind, 94
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(1985), pp. 263-72. Morris clearly distinguishes consistency from broad logical possibility. My terminology is different, but roughly speaking metaphysical possibility is the same as Morris' broad logical possibility, and my analytic contingency corresponds to the consistency of both the proposition and
its negation. I would endorse Morris' examples of the Axiom of Choice and
the Continuum Hypothesis as propositions which are non-contingent in a
non-analytic fashion.
26. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant in fact held that God is an 'ideal of
pure reason', and as such not a construct so much as an indispensable fiction. The contemporary theologian Cupitt has, however, proposed that God
is indeed a construct. See, for instance, Cupitt, Don, The Sea of Faith
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
27. I take it that the Kantian account of the laws of nature as imposed or
constructed by the knowing mind has been dealt serious blows by the
replacement of classical mechanics with general relativity and quantum
mechanics. Concerning these theories I borrow Tertullian's epigram 'I
believe because it is impossible', interpreting this to mean: the surprising
character of these theories, which nonetheless help us understand the world,
is evidence that they are not mere human inventions or constructions but
genuine discoveries.
28. The idea is that what is necessary at a given time is that which is true
at that time, and that time-independent necessity is that which has always
been true. For the details, see Forrest, Peter, 'Physical necessity and the passage of time' in Riggs, P. J. (ed.) Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific
Methodology, Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).
29. As on the Dretske Tooley Armstrong theory of laws of nature as a
relation between universals. See Armstrong D. M. What is a Law of Nature?
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). That theory seems to
assume that facts about properties themselves instantiating (higher order)
relations are necessary. One theistic parallel to this is to submit that divinity,
if there is such a property, is self-instantiated, in which case whether or not
there is such a property is not contingent.
30. As in footnote 9, if it is denied that properties are universals then
'shares any properties' has to be suitably paraphrased.
31. If God is not simple, then, for the purpose of this definition, I stipulate that divine parts or attributes are not 'other beings'.
32. Put to me by William McDonald.
33. The thesis that God is temporal only in the extrinsic fashion is open
to many of the prima facie objections to the divine eternity. For a recent
reply to those prima facie objections see Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann, 'Eternity, Awareness and Action', Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992),
pp. 463-482.
34. To press the analogy with circular time, let us suppose that God
occupies one point on a circle, and that the history of the universe comprises an open semicircular arc consisting of just those points strictly more
than 90° away from God on the circle. We may then correlate points on that
arc with the whole of time as we know it, by representing time as we know
it by points on the tangent to the circle at the point diametrically opposite
God. Lines through the center of the circle intersect both the semicircular arc
and the tangent just once, setting up the one to one correlation. The circle
has two directions (earlier to later and later to earlier) even though these
directions do not correspond to transitive later than and earlier than relations.
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35. William Alston 'Functionalism and Theological Language',

Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985), pp. 221-230.
36. On Twin Earth the stuff which is phenomenally indistinguishable
from water is not water because it is XYZ not H20. Putnam suggests that
the inhabitants of Twin Earth do not express the same belief as we do when
they say that lakes are filled with water, for by 'water' they mean that stuff
(which is in fact XYZ) not this stuff (which is in fact H 20). Nonetheless they
could have the same narrow psychological property, for there could be the
same patterns of spiking frequencies in their brains as in ours and the same
attendant qualia, if any. See Hilary Putnam, 'The meaning of "meaning" , in
K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol 7:
Language, Mind and Knowledge, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1975).
37. Thus a person in the relevant sense might well be taken as an
attribute of the divine substance. (A person, whether human or divine,
would still be a substance in the weak sense of that which can instantiate
properties and relations even though not in the strong sense of that which is
not itself instantiated. In our case our bodies instantiantiate us.) Hence the
three persons are a prima facie threat to the identity of the divine properties.
Let me also note that the idea of a person as a (functionally characterised)
attribute, rather than a substance in the strong sense, coheres well with
physicalism. But that further point of comparison is beyond the scope of
this paper.
38. Part of the simplicity thesis which Plantinga is criticising in Does God
have a Nature? is the identity of God with the divine nature.
39. Nor, since we are assuming divine transcendence is there the problem of how properties distinct in us could be the same in God.
40. To allow for sub-conscious states we should interpret 'introspectible'
to mean 'of the same kind as ones which are introspected'.
41. I have not, note, assumed the sovereignty-aseity intuition. See Does
God have a Nature? pp. 34-7 for Plantinga's statement of the problem of reconciling that intuition with the existence of abstract entities.
42. Campbell, Keith, Body and Mind, (2nd edition) (London: Macmillan,
1970), pp.100-01.
43. Nagel has defended panpsychism but it has not found favour with
physicalists. (See Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions [Cambridge: Cambridge
Liniversity Press, 1979], ch 13.)
44. A way of avoiding this conclusion is to treat X's being conscious as a
matter of X's being aware of something. We may then adopt a Humean No
Self theory in which X's being aware of Y is just a matter of (i) Y's appearing
and (ii) Y's appearing being a constituent of X. In place, therefore, of the
property of consciousness we have the property of appearing. In place of the
imitation person thought experiment we have the thought experiment of a
world like this one except that nothing appears. The resulting issues are
much the same. So even though I favour this approach it is not worth independent discussion.

